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Abstract
Communication plays a major role in social systems. Effective communica-
tions, which requires transmission of the messages between individuals without
disruptions or noise, can be a powerful tool to deliver intended impact. Lan-
guage and style of the content can be leveraged to deceive and manipulate
recipients. These deception and persuasion strategies can be applied to exert
power and amass capital in politics and business. In this work, we provide a
modest review of how such deception and persuasion strategies were applied to
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different communication channels over the years. We provide examples of cam-
paigns that has occurred in different periods over the last 100 years, together
with their corresponding dissemination mediums. In the Internet age, we enjoy
access to the vast amount of information and the ability to communicate with-
out borders. However, malicious actors work toward abusing online systems
to disseminate disinformation, disrupt communication, and manipulate people
by the means of automated tools, such as social bots. It is important to study
the old practices of persuasion to be able to investigate modern practices and
tools. Here we provide a discussion of current threats against society while
drawing parallels with the historical practices and the recent research efforts
on systems of detection and prevention.
1 Introduction
Communication is a central part of the society and crucial for human evolution (Kirch-
ner, 1997). All forms of living organisms develop or inherit ways to interact with
each other (Wiley, 1983). Shannon’s ground-breaking work formally defines the
components of efficient communication systems and introduces concepts about in-
formation, noise, and transmission bandwidth (Shannon, 1949). Through human
history, we see many forms of communication: verbal, written, artistic expressions,
etc. Even one of the simplest forms of communication, drawing, serves as a tan-
gible record that facilitates communication with future generations. Formation of
signals and invention of languages are inevitable for evolving groups and systems to
transfer information (Skyrms, 2010). Over the centuries, technology has helped us
develop more efficient models of communication. Early use of paper and printing
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technologies have ensured the longevity of the records. Invention of the telegraph
and the telephone overcame the difficulty of transmitting information over vast dis-
tances. These peer-to-peer communication systems mirror our natural interactions.
We have also invented different mechanisms to transmit information to larger audi-
ences, instantaneously. The Internet became an archive for virtually all knowledge
by organizing and storing petabytes of data daily. Recent collections surpass any
conventional records of notable events and human narratives in history. Addition-
ally, recent integrated systems have been storing streams of environmental sensory
information and mobility of individuals, creating extensive archives that were not
possible before.
Independent from the underlying technology and modes of communication, ev-
ery communication system consists of three main components: sender, receiver, and
the medium for dissemination. In most cases, transmission between the sender and
the receiver is not perfect, and this can be attributed to the interference of noise
within the medium or how information is encoded and decoded by the sender and
the receiver, respectively. People have developed strategies that can convey infor-
mation effectively by mimicking the receiver, adjusting their message, and trying
to use different properties of the dissemination medium to be able to bridge the
communication gap between two ends.
Cybernetics literature describes the systematic processes of meme diffusion. Heylinghen
shows the factors that contribute to the success of memes and the process that un-
derlies its spread (Heylighen, 1998). He points to a 4-stage process: assimilation,
retention, expression and transmission. Note that the first three step are about
how individuals adopt, process, and embody new information. Only the last stage
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describes the process of dissemination, however, fitness of memes relies on sender,
receiver, and group properties along with the intrinsic qualities of memes.
In social psychology, there is a large body of work on persuasion and social influ-
ence (Chaiken et al., 1996; Cialdini, 1993; Wood, 2000) that talks about various cog-
nitive theories and psychological processes behind how people deceive and influence
each other. Guadagno and Cialdini discuss persuasion and compliance in the context
of Internet-mediated communications, especially textual messages (Guadagno and
Cialdini, 2005). Examples of language and style matching can be seen in the language
mimicry observed in the context of power differentials between discussants (Danescu-
Niculescu-Mizil et al., 2012; Das et al., 2016; Bagrow et al., 2017) and the prediction
of message popularity (Tan et al., 2014).
As the information within our reach grows exponentially, attention becomes the
limiting factor in its consumption. Communication between humans is limited due
to the evolutionary pressure applied by the finite amount of attention and favors
efficiency over clarity (Dunbar, 1992). Herbert Simon introduced the term atten-
tion economy to explain human attention as a scarce commodity and the economic
theory behind the various information processing strategies (Simon, 1971). Imper-
fect communication channels, as described by Shannon, are also relevant to human
communications. Noise introduced to the communication channel might lead to im-
perfect transmission or misinterpretation by the receiver. We have invented different
modes of communication to overcome these attention and noise limitations. When
popularity and influence of the content is an important consideration, information
producers should adopt a variety of strategies to convey their messages or use a
medium that supports broader dissemination. Large-scale broadcasting of informa-
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tion introduces new channels for information dissemination. Radio, television, and
newspapers are some examples of one-to-many communication tools.
The unprecedented increase in social media use may be the result of our limited
attention and desire to reach information fast. Platforms like Twitter mainly serve
as information networks where people follow others to access the content they are
sharing. Social connectivity on information networks deviates from offline social
network structure, where connections between individuals is less likely to reflect their
social relations (Kwak et al., 2010). Facebook and other similar social networks, on
the other hand, reflect offline social network structure better where people tend to
connect with their friends and colleagues. However, information networks promote
formation of connections to maximize our need to access information. To save time
when sharing the same content with larger audiences, we broadcast. To acquire
relevant information, we filter and prioritize content to be able process it within our
attention span. Long term information storage also addresses the limited attention
issue by providing an opportunity to go back and access the necessary information
when desired. Researchers emphasize the importance of the Internet in the study
of mass communication and how theories about communication can be applied to
this new medium (Morris and Ogan, 1996). Research by Philip Howard points to
the important distinction between traditional and modern campaigning, produced
by the shifting political culture (Howard, 2003).
Every communication system has a certain level of noise and disruptions that
impacts the efficiency of the overall system. Temporal durability of the messages
and limited attention of the receivers may be some of the more significant challenges
for earlier communication systems. Recently, we have been facing more serious prob-
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lems: deception, censorship, and abuse. Depending on the platform, malicious actors
have several mechanisms available to them that can exploit the social trust between
individuals and abuse the limited attention of users. Platforms like Facebook rely
on personal connections, and we tend to believe what our friends share and this ten-
dency can be exploited. Information networks like Twitter, where the connections
are built by the information need, on the other hand, are more prone to attacks
by social bots and misleading content. The volume of available online data enables
improved success for manipulation strategies through more accurate micro-targeting
models, as social media platforms provide the tools to directly interact with users.
While each interaction recorded online can be harnessed to develop better systems,
adversaries can also use them to test and measure the performance of their malicious
strategies just as easily. Researchers study these problems and develop systems that
can prevent manipulation and gaming of the system for power and profit. Efforts
to educate Internet users are also very important in the endeavor to prevent the
dissemination of unreliable and misleading news.
In this work, we make a modest attempt to discuss the use of different commu-
nication channels and adoption of persuasion strategies. We aim to point out the
different facets of deception on communication systems. We focus our attention to
highlight the problems that we have been facing in the Internet age.
2 Interplay between politics and communication
Politics, in broad terms, can be defined as the process of making decisions that
apply to all members of a group governed by the same entity. Alternatively, politics
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can represent the ideologies of a person who tries to influence the way a country is
governed. To obtain such power and influence, politicians work towards obtaining
trust of citizens and persuading their opposition to influence their attitudes. They
are required to have strong communication skills and the ability to use available
technologies efficiently to reach their goals.
In the political system, we have been observing the impact of different commu-
nication media and how politicians adapt their strategies to influence and persuade
voters and citizens (Castells, 2007; Krueger, 2006). We depict a timeline representa-
tion of technological development and how politicians adopted these trends in Fig. 1.
In the early days, newspapers and telegraph were important tools to diffuse
news (Even and Monien, 1989; Blondheim, 1994). These technologies accelerated the
information diffusion rate from days to hours. Mobilizing larger crowds for public
speeches in parks and squares became easier, thanks to advertisements which made
informing a broad audience more convenient. They also made sharing important
policy decisions and public affairs more efficient.
The invention of the telephone and the radio, in 1870s and 1920s respectively,
created opportunities for politicians to reach out to even larger groups. Television,
for instance, changed political campaigns significantly (Simon and Ostrom, 1989;
Behr and Iyengar, 1985; West, 2017). Only ten years after the first news program
aired on the BBC, in 1947, President Truman gave his presidential speech live on
TV. This trend was followed by the first TV advertisement placed by Eisenhower
in 1952 and the first presidential debate between Kennedy and Nixon in 1960. One
estimate of President Truman’s campaign indicates that he was able to travel more
than 31k miles and meet 500k voters in person. Only four years later, Eisenhower
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Figure 1: Timeline of US politics and its relation with the technological develop-
ments. Some of the leading events are selected. Top panel presents the influence of
traditional communication mediums such as newspaper, radio and television. Bot-
tom panel starts with the invention of the Internet and presents examples of US
political presence on the internet.
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was able to reach millions through television advertisements (Diamond and Bates,
1992). It is also important to note that the nature of these political contacts during
campaigns have also changed, as studied to learn more about voter behavior and
carefully engineered to steer political discourse.
The information age has transformed our experience in various ways. According
to an analysis by Pew research center, 65 percent of US adults are actively using
social media (Perrin, 2015). The Internet turns out to be a significant resource
to study and answer valuable questions about communication in general (Morris
and Ogan, 1996). Politicians have also become active users of the social media.
They are able to engage with their constituents and campaign on social networks.
Research on online mobilization shows that it is very effective to directly influence
political expression, information seeking and real-world voting behaviour of millions
of people (Bond et al., 2012).
In the last presidential election of the United States, we have observed an active
role of social media. Researchers have been focusing on analyzing disinformation
and social bots to better understand their impact on the election process in many
elections around the world, especially the 2016 presidential election of the United
States (Bessi and Ferrara, 2016; Ferrara, 2017; Howard et al., 2016; Howard and
Kollanyi, 2016). We will discuss more on these subjects in the following sections.
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3 Propaganda and campaigns on traditional me-
dia
Traditional communication channels like newspapers, radio, and TV have changed
how political campaigns were organized and campaign funds were allocated, so these
platforms can be used more efficiently. We provide examples from US politics, how-
ever, these observations are applicable to most countries. Here, we will delve into
campaign strategies adopted on traditional media channels.
Advertisement has a significant role in reaching voters, and the goal of a successful
campaign is to choose the right approach to ultimately win the election. Successful
campaigns are often the ones with the most memorable themes and visuals that help
sway the public opinion.
Since ancient Greek times, rhetoric and elocution have been recognized as the
highest standard for a successful politician. Aristotle’s rhetoric describes three main
mechanisms for persuasion: ethos, pathos, and logos (Aristotle and Kennedy, 1992).
Ethos is an appeal to authority, or the credibility of the presenter. If a presenter
has credibility and possesses certain moral values, these moral values can be utilized
to support a message. Examples of such campaigns were common among cigarette
advertisements, showing actors dressed as doctors to mislead audiences. Pathos
is another important component, which appeals to the emotions of the audience.
Pathos might not only appeal to positive emotions like hope and gratitude, but also
to negative emotions such as fear and feeling threatened. Lastly, logos is the logical
appeal, or the simulation of it. It is commonly used by presenting facts and figures
to support claims made by the presenter. It is often used together with ethos.
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Figure 2: Some of the notable examples of propaganda posters: “Uncle Sam” (Flagg,
1917), “Daddy, what did YOU do in the Great War?” (Committee, 1915), “We Can
Do It!” (Miller, 1943), and a propaganda poster from the USA against Nazis and
Japanese during the WWII (for Emergency Management. Office of War Information.
Domestic Operations Branch. Bureau of Special Services, 1941).
Persuasion and propaganda are the main tools in a traditional campaign. All
forms of campaign media, such as posters, TV ads., etc., are the products of care-
fully engineered themes and messages. How public opinion is created and shaped
in advertisement campaigns is explained by Edward Bernays in his seminal work
“Crystallizing public opinion” together with various examples (Bernays, 2015).
In many cases, persuasion campaigns on politics take the form of propaganda,
where persuaders work to achieve a desired response from the targeted audience by
following a predefined agenda (Cunningham, 2002; Jowett and O’donnell, 2014). Pro-
paganda have been used in the past to recruit people for a cause, manipulate opinions
of groups, and create conflicts between two parties. Earlier engineered propaganda
campaigns used printed media, such as posters and newspaper advertisements, to
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reach their targeted audiences.
Common themes in propaganda posters are depicting an enemy as evil, or por-
traying yourself to look righteous (Mahaney, 2002). Some of the most memorable
posters target various other personal traits and moral foundations as well (see Fig. 2).
For instance, the “I Want You” poster presents Uncle Sam as a way to manifest pa-
triotic emotion, which was used to recruit soldiers for both the first and the second
world wars. A similar example of recruitment propaganda was released by the British
government during WWI, which depicts a daughter posing a question to her father,
“Daddy, what did YOU do in the Great War?”. This poster is trying to manipulate
an able man with the guilt associated with not volunteering for wartime service.
“We Can Do It!” is another propaganda poster that was used to encourage involve-
ment of women in the wartime economy during WWII. It later became popular for
promotion of feminism and other political issues (Shover, 1975; Honey, 1985). An
example of a poster that demonizes the enemy is also presented in Fig. 2. During
war, stereotyping of the citizens of hostile countries and their values can often be
seen in propaganda posters.
Perhaps not surprisingly, we observe an increase in comic book sales during in-
ternational conflicts as well (Murray, 2000). Comic books are used as propaganda
tools predominantly by employing visual cues to present cultural ideas embodied in
flesh-and-blood characters. Ideas about nationalism, societal stability, and strug-
gles over femininity were best presented by Superman, Batman, and Wonderwoman
respectively (Chambliss, 2012). These depictions of ideas also create a state of psy-
chological warfare between nations as well. They aim to gain leverage on their
opponents without military intervention (Linebarger, 2015). The purpose of these
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propaganda campaigns is to affect the morale of their opponents, while making the
current situation more appealing to their own citizens.
Another interesting example where media helped influence the social psyche is
the original Godzilla movie from 1954 (Honda et al., 1954). The movie depicts the
terrible destruction of Tokyo and its citizens, by an unstoppable radioactive monster
whose signature attack is an atomic breath. It has provided the Japanese public, who
were the only firsthand witnesses to the terrible powers of atomic weapons, a chance
of cathartic relief. It has also allowed wider world audiences to face the devastation
that has been brought to Japan, while depicting the nation as an innocent bystander
assaulted by forces beyond its control (Kalat, 2017).
Themes and motives used in political television advertisements show common
parallels with the propaganda posters used during the Second World War. An anal-
ysis of over 800 TV advertising spots between 1960 and 1988 shows that negativity
in the advertisements is mostly appealing to voters’ fears (Kaid and Johnston, 1991).
We observe shared components such as triggering fear and emotions, nationalism,
and demonizing the enemy. Tony Schwartz, a media consultant, has created one of
the most memorable election advertisements in US politics. “Daisy” spot was aired
only once in 1964, but was later replayed several times in other news outlets because
of its emotional impact. In this short clip, the association between a countdown
for the atomic bomb and a young girl counting daisy petals is utilized to trigger
emotional response and fear.
Power of television was widely used by politicians for reaching out to larger
crowds, and increasing awareness of selected topics they deemed significant (Dia-
mond and Bates, 1992; Benoit, 1999; Hermida, 2010; Dimitrova et al., 2014). Ad-
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vertisements play the important role of putting the “typical citizen” on the spot
and setting the norms and important questions. Politicians employ advertisements
by either supporting their own campaigns, or attacking the policies of their oppo-
nents (Simon and Ostrom, 1989; Behr and Iyengar, 1985). One of the first examples
of this effort was known as the “Eisenhower answers America” campaign, where the
President answered questions recorded in a studio that contained important messages
for his campaign.
Associating admired celebrities with certain ideologies is another strategy used
in political campaigns. McAllister discusses the personalization of politicians, and
how political priming works through television (McAllister et al., 2007).
Persuasion is a broad term that covers different types of influence, including
deceptive strategies. We have talked about how advertising is used to influence
political beliefs. However, influence through advertisement is not the only type
that affects and changes belief systems (Cialdini, 2001). Fake news and conspiracy
theories are some examples of such deceptive strategies.
Most deception campaigns use strategies that present content along with con-
flicted facts and distorted claims by authorities (Clarke, 2002; Young and Nathanson,
2010). Conspiracy theories are one of the most extreme but persistent examples of
disinformation. They appeal to the psychological urge to explain that mysterious
things happen for a reason (Goertzel, 1994; Sunstein and Vermeule, 2009). Success-
ful conspiracy theories emerge from a group of supporters, who believe in the sinister
aims of higher entities such as governments, religious groups or even extraterrestrial
life forms (Goodnight and Poulakos, 1981).
Censorship is the practice of repressing the dissemination of the truth, or opin-
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Figure 3: Example of news censorship in Poland (Wrocawia, 1981) on the top. Twit-
ter withheld messages can be seen in the bottom for tweet and user censorship.
ions of opposing parties. Historically, practices such as collecting printed media,
preventing the release of movies, or manipulating pictures or news to hide facts have
been observed. Nazi Germany and USSR government under Joseph Stalin are both
known to have collected books and other printed media and burned them during
political repressions (Goldberg, 2006). Such practices have inspired dystopian novels
like Fahrenheit 451 (Bradbury, 2012) and 1984 (Orwell, 2009).
Censorship demands on various newspapers were protested by printing the cen-
sored content blank (Collins, 1996). Examples of such counter-censorship tactics
can be seen in French, Australian, and Palestinian media. In Fig. 3, we present an
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example of a censored newspaper from Poland dating back to 1981. In response to
censorship, the newspaper decided to print the censored section with just the head-
lines and blank space instead of the text substituted by the censor. Recently, Twitter
has introduced a similar precaution towards governmental censorship requests with
the withheld tweets feature. Withheld tweets are censored only in the country that
made the request to Twitter through official channels like governments and law en-
forcement. Twitter determines the user locations based on the IP addresses to apply
the content censorship selectively. Users accessing Twitter from a censored country
are notified by the template tweets in Fig. 3. Therefore, users are notified that the
tweets they are trying to access are being censored, serving a similar purpose as the
historical examples of white spaces placed by newspaper editors.
We would also like to note that, censorship can also be applied by disrupting the
communication channels and making them nonfunctional for the users, for example,
by the excess activity of social bots. An example of such communication disruption
through bots was observed in Mexico (Sua´rez-Serrato et al., 2016).
4 Deception in the age of the Internet
Technologically mediated communication systems, like social media platforms and
social networks, support the production of information cascades and connect millions
of individuals (Goel et al., 2015; boyd and Ellison, 2010; Vespignani, 2009). Our
society has been going through profound changes about how we consume and produce
information (Aral and Walker, 2012; Bond et al., 2012), how we interact with our
peers (Centola, 2010, 2011), and how we seek information about societal events
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surrounding us (Metaxas and Mustafaraj, 2013, 2012).
We are exposed to a tremendous amount of information through social media
platforms. Social networks help us organize at least a part of this information,
through what our friends share. However, some of the information we share with
our network may be inaccurate, and that means we are unintentionally helping the
dissemination of misinformation. We may be helping malicious entities, and promot-
ing a disinformation campaign by naively sharing content we find appealing. Our
friends in the network are also likely to have similar interests and tendencies as we
do, which leads to the spread of misinformation content due to homophily (McPher-
son et al., 2001).The echo chambers that we live in also help the amplification of this
misinformation (Adamic and Glance, 2005; Conover et al., 2011).
Integrating social media as a dissemination medium provides opportunities for
everyone to share their stories and experiences. Some governments take this as a
threat to their established system and try to mitigate online activity around certain
subjects. One mechanism commonly employed by governments around the world is
using Internet censorship, or blocking service providers. These practices terminate
the users right to access information.
Malicious actors on social media can also employ typical misinformation and
deception campaigns. Astroturf, for instance, is a peculiar form of deception, often
observed on social media in the context of politics and social mobilization (Ratkiewicz
et al., 2011b). It aims to emulate a grassroots conversation through an orchestrated
effort. Although the history of astroturfing and lobbying is older than social net-
works, these platforms provide a more visible stage for the interactions between
online presences of front groups and the promoted accounts (Howard, 2003; Murphy,
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2012). Actors who attempt to generate such orchestrated campaigns generally exploit
fake accounts or social bots (Hwang et al., 2012; Wagner et al., 2012; Ferrara et al.,
2016a). These artificial means allow the generation of a large volume of content, and
emulate the online activity of real users. Cases of massive astroturf campaigns have
been observed during political races such as the US senate (Mustafaraj and Metaxas,
2010) and presidential elections (Metaxas and Mustafaraj, 2012; Bessi and Ferrara,
2016).
In this section, we have provided examples and mechanisms of campaigns that
operate using social bots, disseminate fake news, and apply censorship to restrain
the reach of credible information sources. These practices have become very power-
ful, and the consequences of their involvement remains to be an important research
question.
4.1 Social bots
Increasing evidence suggests that a growing amount of social media content is gener-
ated by autonomous entities known as social bots (Varol et al., 2017a; Howard et al.,
2017; Ferrara et al., 2016a; Aiello et al., 2012). As opposed to social media accounts
controlled by humans, bots are controlled by software, algorithmically generating
content and establishing interactions. While not all social bots are harmful, there
is a growing record of malicious applications of social bots. Some emulate human
behavior to manufacture fake grassroots political support (Ratkiewicz et al., 2011a),
promote terrorist propaganda and recruitment (Berger and Morgan, 2015; Ferrara
et al., 2016c; Bessi and Ferrara, 2016; Woolley, 2016), manipulate the stock market
or advertisements (Clark et al., 2015; Ferrara, 2015), and disseminate rumors and
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conspiracy theories (Bessi et al., 2015a).
Discussion of social bot activity, their broader implications on social networks,
and the detection of these accounts are becoming central research avenues (Lee et al.,
2011; Boshmaf et al., 2011; Ferrara et al., 2016a; Ferrara, 2015). Magnitude of the
problem is underscored by a social bot detection challenge, recently organized by
DARPA to study the information dissemination mediated by automated accounts,
and to detect malicious activities carried out by these bots (Subrahmanian et al.,
2016). A recent study on social bots reports that 9 to 15 percent of all active
users among English-speaking population exhibits bot-likely behaviors (Varol et al.,
2017a). Researchers are also working on identifying social bots with different behav-
ioral patterns and interaction styles. Analysis of social bots during US presidential
election points out that more than 20 percent of the accounts were exhibiting social
bot behavior (Bessi and Ferrara, 2016). Another analysis points that one third of the
total volume of tweets and shared online news articles supporting the political candi-
dates during 2016 election were consisted of fake or extremely biased news (Bovet and
Makse, 2018). Influence of external factors on the US presidential election in 2016 is
a source of controversy. Recent research shows evidence supporting the involvement
of social bots in political discourse (Bessi and Ferrara, 2016).
Participation of social bots on political conversations are not necessarily needed
to be sophisticated. Simple interactions such as retweeting can still be powerful,
considering the visibility it might lead to. Purchasing fake followers is also common
among politicians that wish to create a false impression of popularity (Woolley, 2016).
Recent research shows evidence that social bots played a key role in the spread of
fake news during the 2016 US presidential election (Shao et al., 2017) and most of the
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central actors in the diffusion network consisted of bots (Shao et al., 2018). Social
bots are also known to disrupt conversations by flooding a particular conversation
channel with content. Pollution of conversations on social media makes it intractable
for individuals looking for useful information.
Social bots can also be used for coordinated activities where large collections of
social bots, also known as botnets, are controlled by botmasters. Examples of such
botnets have been identified for advertisements (Echeverra and Zhou, 2017) and
influencing Syrian civil war (Abokhodair et al., 2015). The orchestrated behavior
of thousands of bots is worrisome, since they can be used to pollute conversation
channels, boost the popularity of disinformation content, and target individuals to
deceive them on certain subjects. Social bots also vary greatly in terms of their
behavior, intent, and vulnerabilities, as described by Mitter et al. (Mitter et al.,
2013).
4.2 Fake news
The term fake news is not new (Lippmann, 2004), yet the prevalence of the online
disinformation come in different forms and properties: hoaxes, rumors, conspiracy
theories, etc. Fake news websites deliberately publish hoaxes, propaganda, and dis-
information pretending to be a legitimate news source. They often aim to mislead
readers, unlike the satirical news websites that may appear similar, in exchange for
political and financial gain.
A large amount of disinformation spreads online, and their prevalence and per-
suasiveness can affect serious decisions around important topics such as vaccina-
tion (Kata, 2012; Nyhan et al., 2013; Buttenheim et al., 2015), elections (Allcott and
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Gentzkow, 2017; Mustafaraj and Metaxas, 2017; Giglietto et al., 2016; Rojecki and
Meraz, 2016) and stock market behavior (Carvalho et al., 2011; Lauricella et al., 2013)
among other issues. A recent study suggests that misinformation is just as likely to
go viral as reliable information (Shao et al., 2016; Qiu et al., 2017). One of the
mechanisms promoting the persistence of fake news is the copycat websites. Copy-
cat websites operate by duplicating the original content with only trivial changes. If
the original article contains misinformation, copycat websites replicate this misinfor-
mation as well. Corrections or removal of the original source are no longer relevant or
useful, since many other media outlets are already affected and have already dissem-
inated false information. We can make an analogy between the dissemination of fake
news through multiple media outlets and a disease spreading in groups, vaccination
or treatment of a single individual will not stop an epidemic by itself. In some cases,
even reliable sources can publish misinformation, simply because of the competition
introduced by online journalism.The rush to break the news first has lead news agen-
cies to employ automation tools in their workflows, from tools that write complete
articles like the Automated Insights used by Associated Press,1 to news discovery
tools like the Reuters Tracer by Reuters. Reuters Tracer parses through millions of
tweets every day and reportedly gives Reuters a 8 to 60 minutes of a headstart on
news pieces against its competitors (Liu et al., 2017). While automated tools like
the Reuters Tracer are being employed to help verify stories in a timely manner as
well (Liu et al., 2017), the continuously narrowing window to break a story may lead
to articles lacking deliberate investigation which will then be picked up and dissem-
inated by copycat sites before any corrections can be made. It is almost impossible
1https://automatedinsights.com/case-studies/associated-press
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to propagate corrections to all other copycat articles that are based on the original
piece. (Janowitz, 1975)
Recent research efforts have also focused on modeling the diffusion of misinfor-
mation (Del Vicario et al., 2016; Bessi et al., 2015a,b; Friggeri et al., 2014; Jin et al.,
2013). Algorithmic efforts on detecting rumors and misinformation are also crucial to
prevent the spread of campaigns with malicious intents (Varol et al., 2017b; Ferrara
et al., 2016b; Resnick et al., 2014; Metaxas et al., 2015; Qazvinian et al., 2011).
Journalists and readers both have important roles and responsibilities to hinder
the dissemination of fake news. Online websites like FactCheck,2 PolitiFact,3 and
Snopes4 provide fact-checking services to debunk fake news. Fact-checking provided
by online services influences the opinions of voters, and provides politicians a guide in
judging what news might be fake before disseminating it (Fridkin et al., 2015; Nyhan
and Reifler, 2015). Researchers are working on designing systems that can evaluate
the credibility and truthfulness of claims in order to automate the fact-checking
process (Ciampaglia et al., 2015; Wu et al., 2014).
The problem with fake news can be partially resolved by educating Internet
users. News literacy is important, and everyone should at least make an effort to
learn how they can identify fake news. Recently, we have been observing a growing
community of fact-checkers. Poynter is one of these organizations, which has released
“International Fact-Checking Network fact-checkers’ code of principles”5 to promote
excellence in fact-checking. Another noteworthy example is First draft.6 These
2factcheck.org
3politifact.com
4snopes.com
5poynter.org/fact-checkers-code-of-principles/
6firstdraftnews.com
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organizations not only provide fact-checked information about popular claims, but
they also monitor political campaigns and elections. Collaboration between different
fact-checking organizations is promoted by proposing an integrated system to share
fact-checking information by implementing ClaimReview schema.7
4.3 Censorship
Preventing censorship and supporting the freedom of speech is crucial in continuing
services like social networks, where people can freely express their opinion as long as
they avoid disruptive behavior such as abuse and harassment. According to a report
by the watchdog organization Freedom House, out of 65 countries tracked, 49 of them
have received a rating of “Not Free” or “Partly Free” on internet freedom within the
observation period of June 2016 to May 2017. This means less than a quarter of the
users are living in countries where internet has received “Free” designation. While
the report also states that the internet is still more free from censorship compared
to traditional press, it points out that internet freedom has declined in 32 countries
while making mostly minor gains in only 13, showing a downward trend (Kelly et al.,
2017).
In some societies, governments have responded to the political mobilizations by
either terminating the access to online services, or developing laws to restrict the
exchange of information (Zhang, 2006). China, Iran, North Korea, and Turkey are
examples of countries applying internet censorship widely. These countries are moni-
toring social media and news with the intention of controlling the online discourse. If
discussions steer into sensitive topics, concerned governments intervene and attempt
7schema.org/ClaimReview
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to control information dissemination (King et al., 2013; Ali and Fahmy, 2013).
Platforms like Facebook and Twitter have been censored in the past by limiting
the internet access at the country level. Social media companies have recently cre-
ated specialized legal departments to address requests from governments, with hopes
to provide continuous service for their users in countries that employ censorship reg-
ularly. Periodically, transparency reports are released by technology companies like
Facebook,8 Twitter,9 Microsoft,10 and Google.11 These reports contain the statis-
tics of requests received from different governments, including requests for disclosure
of information. The increasing trend in government requests for disclosure of user
information and censorship requests are worrisome.
Many censorship regulations are developed to control or limit dissemination of
political discussions. A recent study highlights a significant rate of content removal
on Weibo (Bamman et al., 2012). They estimated that 16 percent of the posts
compared to overall activity are deleted by authorities on Weibo due to their political
content. The content analysis of the censorship on Weibo points out that, content
that is aiming to create oppositional awareness towards the Chinese Communist
Party are censored more frequently (Vuori and Paltemaa, 2015). The political impact
of micro-blogging platforms was analyzed by comparing Twitter and Weibo use in
China (Sullivan, 2012).
In another analysis of Weibo, researchers have studied the mechanism of Weibo’s
trending topic detection system to track sensitive viral discussions (Zhu et al., 2012).
8govtrequests.facebook.com
9transparency.twitter.com
10microsoft.com/en-us/about/corporate-responsibility/reports-hub
11google.com/transparencyreport
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Authors have also showed the mechanism behind content filtering by tracking sen-
sitive users (Zhu et al., 2013). They have found that the trend of a sensitive viral
topic is short-lived, which points to the effectiveness of Weibo’s censorship on sensi-
tive topics.
Twitter requires legal documents to censor content on their platform, unlike the
Chinese social media that has centralized control over censorship with no regulatory
oversight. Twitter announced their “withheld tweet” mechanisms to abide by gov-
ernmental requests in 2012 after the Internet service provider (ISP) level blockages
by various governments. If removal requests are submitted properly by authorized
entities, Twitter grants censorship to these requests. Other than content removal,
Twitter can limit access to a particular tweet or user when requested by governments.
Previous analysis of Twitter withheld content shows that the topical groups that get
censored are emerging around politically sensitive topics (Tanash et al., 2015). There
has also been an increasing trend in the amount of censored content on Twitter over
the years (Varol, 2016).
Historically, censorship implies hindering peoples access to content. An alterna-
tive mechanism of censorship is the manipulation of the source directly. A well-known
example of such manipulation is the edited photographs from USSR under Joseph
Stalin’s government, where members of the party that fell out of favor were removed
from the pictures. Editorial censorship of newspapers and books are additional ex-
amples of such manipulation. These strategies have become much more difficult in
the current online systems, where records of a source are replicated and stored in a
distributed manner. However, it is also possible censor content by polluting the com-
munication medium. Finding reliable information within low signal to information
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ratio channels is becoming a new challenge. It is possible to use social bots to create
bursts of posts to distract users and pollute communication channels. An example
of such channel disruptions were observed in Mexico recently (Sua´rez-Serrato et al.,
2016), when different hashtags were flooded by social bots, forcing people to move
the discussion to alternative channels.
Technical developments like VPN services or the TOR project12 can provide re-
silience against censorship attempts. Researchers have also built services to quanti-
tatively measure the censorship problem (Burnett and Feamster, 2013) and analyze
the examples of country-wide Internet outages (Dainotti et al., 2011; Verkamp and
Gupta, 2012).
So far, we have briefly described the strategies and mechanisms of deception for
traditional media and online platforms. We have also presented recent research efforts
for detecting malicious intentions and building platforms to improve the existing
situation.
5 Discussion
We have shown the mechanisms of traditional campaigns and modern persuasion
techniques so far. Here, we will discuss how we can benefit from the lessons pro-
vided by historical evidence and prepare to engage malicious actors proactively. We
will present modern threats for the online echo-chambers and introduce research
directions for prevention mechanisms.
Current campaigns have been adapting their tactics from the historical examples
12torproject.org
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we have presented to the developments in technology. Tools for dissemination and
manipulation have also been evolving and developing alongside campaign tactics to
address the new demands of advancements. In terms of human behavior, we are still
vulnerable to the similar cognitive biases, which can be used to manipulate opinions
of and trigger certain behaviors from individuals and groups. Taking similarities and
differences between modern and historical campaigns into consideration, we have the
chance to turn the technological and research efforts into our advantage.
Efforts in designing viral online campaigns have yielded the development of mod-
ern marketing tools and strategies. Unfortunately, malicious actors are also able to
benefit from such developments and adopt them to achieve their ends. Successful
campaigns often rely on carefully designed messages and punctual timing. Experts
in social psychology can identify possible concepts to frame their campaigns to tar-
get specific groups. Nowadays, the volume and velocity of the data are significantly
increased, and thanks to that, evaluating different strategies for manipulation and
framing messages have become virtually effortless. The abundance of digital data
and developments on personalization might result in building targeted campaigns
and the ability to rapidly evaluate the effects of different campaign components. We
are living in a data-rich world that helps with accurate estimates of demographics
and personal characteristics (Kosinski et al., 2013).
Researchers demonstrated the predictive power of Facebook data in a 2013 article
by predicting various personality traits, demographic information, sexual orientation,
and political leaning (Kosinski et al., 2013). Facebook has also published results of
their experiment on randomized controlled trial of political mobilization messages
during 2010 US congressional elections, in which they delivered messages to 61 Mil-
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lion users (Bond et al., 2012). Facebook demonstrated how minor interventions to
the content they deliver can influence real-world voting behavior. Emotional conta-
gion phenomenon is also demonstrated on Facebook by manipulating the content of
the posts Kramer et al. (2014). This work shows experimental evidence on emotional
contagion without direct interaction between individuals.
The recent example of a controversy about a British political consulting firm
called Cambridge Analytica demonstrates how a social media platform can become
an instrument for political manipulation. The company claims that they have capa-
bilities to build psychographics models to predict the propensities of user behavior
towards different stimuli such as social media posts with different sentiment and
content. Their data collection methods raise serious concerns about privacy and
breach of institutional review board (IRB) protocols. Researchers from Cambridge
University have created a Facebook application called thisisyourdigitallife to
collect the information of users and their friends for a research project, however this
data later got shared with Cambridge Analytica to build models that company has
claimed to be effective for micro-targeting.13 Although effectiveness of Cambridge
Analytica’s methodologies is still not clear, it is important to make our points on
data privacy and use of technology for political manipulation.
Another past case, a UCLA mathematician who has employed social bots, user
profiling and targeting on an online dating platform, may serve as a concrete example
to help understand how these methods can be employed to achieve real-world results.
He has used social bots, that were programmed to mimic human users to circumvent
13niemanlab.org/2018/03/this-is-how-cambridge-analyticas-facebook-targeting-model-really-
worked-according-to-the-person-who-built-it
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safety measures, to mine OKCupid, a popular dating site, for the data from thousands
of users. He then used this data to profile users and found out that the users fell
within one of seven distinct clusters. He analyzed these clusters and decided that
he was only interested in users within two out of the seven. Finally, he has used
a machine-learning algorithm to target these users and help maximize his match
percentage with them, resulting in a very large number of users with unusually high
match percentages (Poulsen, 2014). It demonstrates that, with the necessary know-
how, even a single person with limited resources can achieve meaningful real-world
impact.
Social bots have been getting increasingly better fake persona generation (Li
et al., 2016a; Bhatia et al., 2017) and conversation models thanks to the advance-
ments in deep-learning technologies (Sordoni et al., 2015; Li et al., 2016b). Such
technologies make detection of social bots more difficult and provide an advantage
to the bot creators in this arms race. Targeted attacks are made possible through
the anonymous use of social media, by orchestrating a large army of social bots,
trolls (McCosker, 2014; Aro, 2016), sock puppets, and bullies (Bellmore et al., 2015;
Resnik et al., 2016). Examples of extremist activities on social media have been in-
creasing at an alarming rate, and many platforms have started taking precautions for
early-detection and prevention of such activities. Recent studies have also pointed to
the use of social media for the recruitment efforts of terrorist organizations (Berger
and Morgan, 2015; Ferrara et al., 2016c; Magdy et al., 2015).
Increasing online participation on websites and social media is creating new av-
enues for and enabling new forms of deception and manipulation (Phillips and Mil-
ner, 2018). We have been particularly observing the societal impact of disinforma-
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tion manufactured with the intent of drawing an extreme reaction, disseminated by
cloaked websites and accounts (Daniels, 2009; Farkas et al., 2017). It is important
and valuable to understand the roots of the problem before setting out to propose so-
lutions. Confirmation bias is considered one of the contributing factors (Nickerson,
1998). According to this hypothesis, people tend to believe and seek information
supporting their initial opinions. An alternative explanation considers the attention
paid to judge the credibility of the source. Herbert Simon’s work on attention econ-
omy might help explain some of our mental shortcuts; we tend to believe a content
based on our opinions about the friend who had shared it with us. Researchers have
studied when readers pay attention to the source of the content (Kang et al., 2011).
They have found that users tend to believe the content based solely on the source
they obtained it from, unless the subject is really important to them. Trust towards
personal contacts also makes individuals more vulnerable to attacks such as phish-
ing (Jagatic et al., 2007). These problems can be alleviated by focusing on news
literacy. It is possible to restrain the prevalence of fake news when educated online
users are combined with appropriate fact-checking tools. A recent review on fake
news lays out a future agenda and invites interdisciplinary research efforts to study
the spread of fake news and its underlying mechanisms (Lazer et al., 2018).
Throughout the 20th century, people living in a number of developed countries
had access to credible information through accountable sources, where the content
was monitored by editorial boards for accuracy prior to publishing. However, in
the age of Internet, the mechanisms for information production by journalists and
news websites have been changing (Giglietto et al., 2016). These changes are also
effecting how we access and consume information. Most of the content of an article
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is created by an original source where many other websites can copy it from, and
various services can propagate the content even further. The role of social media in
this process is crucial, since users can share those links through their network. These
cascades of dissemination can cause problems if the original content has erroneous
claims. Correcting the original source after the fact in this process is not likely to
fix copycat content and misinformation already disseminated by social media users.
We should also raise our concerns about the third-party applications connected
to social media accounts with user permissions. If these applications are breached by
malicious entities, they can be employed to disturb communication channels and dis-
seminate misinformation. A recent example of such an attack have targeted hundreds
of Twitter accounts, including popular news organizations and celebrities, when a
third-party analytics application was compromised(Kharpal, 2017). These accounts
have posted tweets, written in Turkish, that contained the swastika symbol and hash-
tags which, when translated, mean “Nazi Germany” and “Nazi Holland”. Accounts
compromised by this attack, such as Forbes (@forbes), Germany soccer club Borus-
sia Dortmund (@BVB), and Justin Bieber’s Japanese account (@bieber japan) have
the combined follower count of several millions. Considering the wide reach of such
a compromise in a 3rd party application is worrisome.
Another concern on third-party applications is their ability to change social ties.
Applications with necessary permissions can follow and unfollow accounts through
APIs. This can lead to long-term manipulation of how people access information by
selectively filtering content or providing exposure to certain users. Segregation and
filter bubbles are foreseeable threats that can utilize untrustworthy or compromised
applications. Similarly, adversaries can benefit from the changing attitudes towards
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fake followers to discredit influential accounts by contaminating their followers with
social bots. It is important to develop methodologies that can be employed by the
platforms to identify these attacks, build preventive strategies, and prevent data
breaches.
Sir Tim Berners-Lee published a post on the 29th birthday of World Wide Web
to share some concerns and challenge our community to make WWW a safer, more
accessible, and transparent place for everyone.14 There are significant efforts to pre-
serve the social ecosystem. Researchers are developing tools like Botometer15 (Davis
et al., 2016; Varol et al., 2017a) to detect social bots on Twitter, Hoaxy16 (Shao
et al., 2016) to study dissemination of fake news, and TweetCred17 (Gupta et al.,
2014) to evaluate the credibility of tweet contents. The Jigsaw lab of Google also has
significant efforts to tackle some of the global security challenges, working on systems
and tools to prevent censorship and online harassment.18 Considering the impact of
technology on the dissemination of misinformation, we share a great responsibility to
work together. We should also be aware of the limitations of human-mediated sys-
tems as well as algorithmic approaches and employ them wisely and appropriately to
tackle the weaknesses of existing communication systems. Computer scientists, so-
cial scientists, journalists, and other industry partners must collaborate in the effort
to implement policies and systems against online threats for an effective resistance.
14webfoundation.org/2018/03/web-birthday-29
15botometer.iuni.iu.edu
16hoaxy.iuni.iu.edu
17twitdigest.iiitd.edu.in/TweetCred
18jigsaw.google.com
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